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 Pro se appellant Mark Fields (“Fields”) appeals from a final order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of Fields’ complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B). 
On October 6, 2006, Fields was sentenced by the Honorable Sheila Venable in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey to a term of confinement of nine years.  On January 9, 
2011, he was released to a mandatory five-year period of supervision.  During that time, 
Fields repeatedly tested positive for controlled substances.  As a result, a parole officer 
issued a warrant, and Fields was arrested for violating the terms of his supervision.  Upon 
arrest, an empty glassine envelope was found on Fields, and he admitted to using heroin.  
Following two hearings at which he was represented by counsel, Hearing Officer Carla 
Shabazz recommended that Fields’ term of mandatory supervision be revoked.  The 
Parole Board accepted Officer Shabazz’s recommendation and revoked Fields’ period of 
mandatory supervision and ordered Fields to serve a parole ineligibility term of 12 
months.  Fields’ administrative appeal was denied.   
 Fields filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various 
constitutional violations by the defendants arising out of the revocation of his mandatory 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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supervision.  On February 5, 2016, the District Court dismissed with prejudice the claims 
against the judicial defendant and the parole officers who conducted Fields’ revocation 
hearing and review, concluding that each defendant was immune from suit.  The District 
Court dismissed without prejudice to amendment the remainder of Fields’ claims for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  The District Court dismissed as 
moot Fields’ motions for a psychiatric evaluation and for a spoliation sanction.1  Finally, 
the District Court permitted Fields to move for leave to file a second amended complaint.  
On March 7, 2016, without filing any sort of amendment, Fields filed a notice of appeal.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Our review of the District Court’s 
dismissal of Fields’ complaint is plenary.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Allah, 229 F.3d at 223.  To 
                                              
1 Although Fields does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of his motion 
requesting a psychiatric evaluation as moot, we note that the federal district courts have a 
duty of inquiry to determine whether there is verifiable evidence of the incompetence of a 
pro se litigant.  Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2012).  Fields’ motion 
asked for a psychological evaluation with regards to his claim of infliction of emotional 
distress.  The motion did not contain any reason to believe that Fields was incompetent.  
Additionally, Fields does not present any argument on appeal regarding his motion for a 
spoliation sanction.    
2 “Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor 
appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the 
cause of action.”  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976).  Such an 
order becomes final and appealable, though, if the plaintiff declares his intention to 
“stand on the complaint.”  Id. at 952.  Because Fields clearly indicated in his notice of 
appeal that he was electing to stand on his complaint, we have appellate jurisdiction. 
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state a legally sufficient claim for relief, a plaintiff need only plead enough factual 
content, taken as true, to support “the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.”  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).   
 First, Fields claims that the District Court erred in failing to screen his original 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  On May 7, 2015, the District Court granted 
Fields’ application to proceed in forma pauperis, and his complaint was deemed filed.  At 
that time, the District Court indicated that it had begun its sua sponte screening of the 
complaint pursuant to Section 1915A; however, before the District Court completed its 
review, Fields filed a premature notice of appeal and, thereafter, an amended complaint.3  
Fields’ appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute and, shortly after that, the District 
Court dismissed Fields’ amended complaint pursuant to Sections 1915A and 
1915(e)(2)(B).  Accordingly, the District Court’s inability to complete its screening of the 
original complaint was attributable to Fields’ act of filing an amended complaint.  The 
District Court did, however, fulfill its duty to screen the amended complaint.  Moreover, 
Fields has alleged no harm resulting from the District Court screening only his amended 
complaint, and we perceive none.  
                                              
3 Fields also contends that the District Court erred in construing his request for a jury 
demand as a motion to amend his complaint.  Fields’ motion was vague and unclear; 
however, he did attach an amended complaint to the motion.  Rule 15 does not prescribe 
any particular technical method of amendment, and pro se pleadings are to be construed 
liberally.  The District Court’s interpretation of Fields’ motion as a motion to amend his 
complaint was a reasonable reading of the filing, and the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in so ruling.  
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Fields next argues that his constitutional rights were violated because he was 
incarcerated before, during, and after his revocation proceedings.  He alleges that his 
incarceration was unconstitutional because his arrest was illegal and he was denied due 
process at his revocation hearings.  Applying the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994), we have held that § 1983 actions that, if successful, would necessarily 
demonstrate the invalidity of a parole board’s decision (regarding the length or revocation 
of parole) are not cognizable unless and until the board’s decision has been invalidated.  
See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006).  We take his specific 
allegations in turn. 
First, Fields’ claim that his incarceration was unconstitutional because the 
defendants made erroneous factual findings is barred under Heck.  If, as Fields argued, 
the defendants made erroneous factual findings, the revocation of his mandatory 
supervision would be invalid.  Success on his this claim would necessarily invalidate the 
parole board’s decision, which has not otherwise been invalidated.4  See id.  
Fields also claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an 
improperly issued arrest warrant and an illegal search upon his arrest.  Upon his arrest by 
warrant, Fields was found to have an empty glassine envelope and he admitted to using 
                                              
4 Fields filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his revocation proceedings.  The 
petition was dismissed as moot as Fields had been released from custody.  We denied his 
request for a certificate of appealability.  Fields v. Venable, No. 16-2817 (order entered 
on September 20, 2016).  Heck’s favorable termination requirement applies even when 
there is no further possibility of a successful habeas petition.  See Williams v. Consovoy, 
453 F.3d 173, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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the heroin that had been contained in the envelope.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
if the warrant, envelope, and statement were suppressed, the invalidity of his revocation 
would necessarily be implied.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.  Accordingly, because the 
Parole Board’s decision in Fields’ case has not been invalidated by an appropriate 
tribunal, Fields may not attack it in a § 1983 action.5   
Fields also argued that his incarceration was unconstitutional because the 
defendants conspired to revoke his mandatory supervision without notice or a hearing.  
To the extent that Fields challenges the process of the revocation proceedings, this 
presents a closer call, as some due process claims do not imply the invalidity of a 
revocation.  See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (explaining that claims 
directed at certain state procedures used to determine parole eligibility were not Heck-
barred because “success” for the plaintiffs meant, at most, a new parole hearing).  We 
doubt that Fields’ claims fall within the ambit of Wilkinson.  In any event, Fields’ due 
process claims are not viable.  See Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (noting that we may affirm on any ground apparent in the record).  
 At a minimum, due process requires that there be: (a) written notice of the claimed 
violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity 
to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to  
                                              
5 This claim is also barred because Fields has not alleged that his arrest caused him an 
injury other than “the ‘injury’ of being convicted and imprisoned.”  Heck, 512 U.S. at 
487 n.7.   
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confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; 
and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-488 (1972).  Fields claimed 
that he was not provided with notice and that he did not have a hearing; however, the 
exhibits attached to his complaint as well as his arguments put forth elsewhere in his 
complaint undermine these allegations.  See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (noting that documents attached to a complaint may be considered on Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) review).  To the contrary, they demonstrate that he received 
constitutionally sufficient notice (over a week prior to the hearing, enough time to permit 
both Fields and his attorney to be present at the hearing).  Accordingly, Fields’ complaint 
failed to plausibly state a claim that the hearing violated the minimum requirements for 
due process set forth in Morrissey.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 In his final allegation of error on appeal, Fields contends that the District Court 
erred in denying his motion to appoint counsel prior to deeming his complaint to be filed.  
We review a district court’s decision declining to appoint counsel for abuse of 
discretion.  Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002).  In deciding 
whether to make an appointment, the court must determine, as a threshold matter, if the 
claim has arguable merit in fact and law.  Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 
1993).  If this threshold is met, the court considers a number of additional factors.  See id. 
at 156.  As discussed supra, Fields failed to state a claim for relief under the Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  For substantially the same reasons given by the 
8 
 
District Court, Fields’ remaining claims, which he did not renew on appeal, also lacked 
merit.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
